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Abstract
Power (along with EM, cache and timing) leaks are of
considerable concern for developers who have to deal
with cryptographic components as part of their overall
software implementation, in particular in the context of
embedded devices. Whilst there exist some compiler
tools to detect timing leaks, similar progress towards
pinpointing power and EM leaks has been hampered by
limits on the amount of information available about the
physical components from which such leaks originate.
We suggest a novel modelling technique capable of
producing high-quality instruction-level power (and/or
EM) models without requiring a detailed hardware de-
scription of a processor nor information about the used
process technology (access to both of which is typically
restricted). We show that our methodology is effective
at capturing differential data-dependent effects as neigh-
bouring instructions in a sequence vary. We also ex-
plore register effects, and verify our models across sev-
eral measurement boards to comment on board effects
and portability. We confirm its versatility by demon-
strating the basic technique on two processors (the ARM
Cortex-M0 and M4), and use the M0 models to develop
ELMO, the first leakage simulator for the ARM Cortex
M0.
1 Introduction
Early evaluation of the leakage properties of security-
critical code is an essential step in the design of secure
technology. A developer in possession of a good quality
explanatory model for (e.g.) the power consumption or
electromagnetic radiation of a particular device can use
this to predict the leakage traces arising from a particu-
lar code sequence and so identify (and address) possible
points of weakness. Whilst the smart-card community
is accustomed to support from side-channel testing fa-
cilities (either in-house or via external evaluation labs),
there is a distinct lack of equivalent dedicated exper-
tise in the fast-growing realm of the Internet-of-Things
(IoT). This new market is rife with small start-ups whose
limited budgets and rapid pace of advancement are in-
compatible with the prices and typical workflow of in-
dependent evaluators. Thus there arises a pressing need
for user-friendly tools which easily integrate with es-
tablished software development practice—typically in C
and/or assembly, depending on the performance require-
ments of a given application—to assist in making that
practice more security-aware.
Whilst there are tools to identify timing leaks such as
ctgrind [16], there are no such easy tools for detecting
power or EM leaks in programs. The reason for this is
easily explained: timing information for instructions is
readily available, however, accurate models for the in-
stantaneous power consumption or EM emanations are
not available.
The challenge of acquiring a good quality power
model is in choosing what to include far more than it
is in choosing between particular statistical techniques.
The power consumption of a device bears a complex
relationship with its various components and processes,
necessitating a trade-off between precisely capturing as
many details as possible and keeping within reasonable
computational and sampling bounds. Transistor (re-
spectively cell) netlists can be used to derive accurate
gate-level models [17, Ch. 3], but for the purposes of
development-stage side-channel testing in software, we
require assembly level models.
Earlier efforts focused on assembly instructions to en-
sure covering vulnerabilities which might be introduced
at compilation time, but (over-) simplified the modelling
aspect by relying on Hamming weight and distance as-
sumptions [7, 26]. A more recent, higher-level proposal
based on C++ code representation also uses simplified
leakage assumptions, although the author does acknowl-
edge the potential for more sophisticated profiling [28].
Among the existing works only Debande et al. [6] em-
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phasise the importance of (and the complexities involved
in) deriving realistic leakage models empirically. They
fit linear models in function of the state bits and state
transitions using the techniques of linear regression.
However, such models are still considerably simpli-
fied relative to what is known about the complex factors
driving device power consumption. For instance, much
earlier efforts to model total energy consumption for the
purposes of optimising code for constrained devices [27]
showed clearly that the power consumed by a particular
instruction varies according to the instructions previous
in the sequence.
Another important aspect of power model construc-
tion, as emphasised by recent contributions in the tem-
plate building literature [5, 11, 20], is portability be-
tween different devices of the same design.
1.1 Our Contributions
We present a strategy for building refined assembly code
instruction-level power trace simulators and show that it
is applicable to two processors relevant to the IoT con-
text: the ARM Cortex M0 and M4. We develop the tool
fully for the M0 and verify its utility for side-channel
early evaluation.
The first part of our contribution is a side-channel
modelling procedure novel for the thoroughness it attains
by incorporating established linear regression model-
selection techniques. We combine a priori knowledge
about the M0 and the M4 with power (respectively EM)
leakage samples obtained in carefully designed exper-
iments, and use ordinary least squares (OLS) estima-
tion and joint F-tests to decide between candidate ex-
planatory variables in pursuit of models which account
well for the exploitable aspects of the side-channel leak-
age whilst avoiding redundant complexity. The effects
that we explore include instruction operands, bit-flips be-
tween consecutive operands, data-dependent interactions
with previous and subsequent instructions in a sequence,
register interactions, and higher-order operand and tran-
sition interactions. We verify portability by testing for
board effects, which show no evidence of varying differ-
entially with the processed data. We also show (via clus-
tering analysis) that a set of 21 key M0 instructions can
be meaningfully reduced to just five similarly-leaking
classes, thereby greatly reducing the complexity of the
modelling task. As well as enhancing the accuracy and
nuance of our predicted traces relative to previous work,
our systematic method of selecting and testing potential
explanatory variables provides valuable insights into the
leakage features of the ARM Cortex devices examined,
which are of independent interest.
The second part of our contribution is a procedure to
extract the data flows of arbitrary code sequences which
can subsequently be mapped to trace predictions via our
carefully refined models. We do this for the M0 by adapt-
ing an open-source instruction set simulator, chosen to
enable us to eventually release a full open-source ver-
sion of our own tool. We then demonstrate the utility of
the simulator for flagging up even unexpected leaks in
cryptographic implementations, by performing leakage
detection tests against simulated and real measurements
associated with an imperfectly-protected code sequence.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in
Section 2 we review the previous work on leakage mod-
elling, and provide a very brief overview of the key fea-
tures of the ARM Cortex architecture and the Thumb in-
struction set, alongside some information about our tai-
lored acquisition procedure. In Section 3 we outline our
methodology for leakage characterisation and for testing
for significant contributory effects. In Section 4 we ex-
plore the data-dependent leakage characteristics of each
considered instruction taken individually, and empiri-
cally confirm the natural clustering of like instructions.
In Section 5 we build complex models for the M0, al-
lowing for the effects of neighbouring instructions and
higher-order interactions and testing for the possibility
of board and register effects. In Section 6 we explain
how to use the models to simulate power traces, analyse
them, and draw conclusions about leaking instructions.
Closing remarks and open questions follow in Section 7.
2 Background
In this section we aim to provide enough context for
our paper to be reasonably self-contained for a reader
not familiar with the tasks of leakage modelling and
model evaluation (Sect. 2.1), the ARM Cortex-M pro-
cessor family (Sect. 2.2), assembly code instructions
(Sect. 2.3) and/or typical side-channel measurement set-
ups (Sect. 2.4).
2.1 Leakage Modelling Techniques
Modelling power consumption always involves a trade-
off between precision and economy (with respect to time,
memory usage and input data required). The most de-
tailed (‘white box’) efforts take place at the analog or
logic level and aim to characterise the power consumed
by every component in (part of) a circuit. For the pur-
poses of side-channel analysis, simpler, targeted (‘black
box’) models can be estimated from sampled traces for
particular intermediate values. Instruction-level models
of the type we propose represent a (‘grey box’) middle
ground, combining some relatively detailed knowledge
of the implementation with empirical analysis of care-
fully sampled leakage traces. We briefly overview these
three research directions below, followed by a summary
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of some typical approaches to the difficult task of model
quality evaluation.
2.1.1 Model Building Utilising Processor/Imple-
mentation Specific Information
Netlists describing all the transistor connections in a cir-
cuit, along with their parasitic capacitances, can be used
to perform analog simulations of the whole or a part of
the circuit. This process involves solving numerous dif-
ference equations and is highly resource intensive. A
less costly (but also less precise) logic-level alternative
uses cell-level netlists, back-annotated with information
about signal delays and rise and fall times. These are
used to simulate the transitions occurring in the circuit,
which are subsequently mapped to a power trace accord-
ing to knowledge of the capacitive loads of the cell out-
puts. Alternatively, the number of transitions occurring
can be taken as a simplified approximation of the power
consumption, which implicitly amounts to the assump-
tion that all 0→ 1 transitions contribute equally to 1→ 0
transitions (and similarly for 0→ 0 and 1→ 1 transi-
tions). See Chapter 3 of [17] for more details. Note that
even these most exhaustive of strategies, which may be
collectively classed as ‘white box’ modelling due to their
reliance on comprehensive implementation details, fail
to account for influences on the leakage outside the in-
formation provided by the netlist (for instance crosstalk)
and therefore represent simplifications of varying imper-
fection.
2.1.2 Model Building for Intermediate Instructions
For the purposes of side-channel analysis and evaluation,
it suffices to build models only for power consumption
which (potentially) bears a relationship to the processing
of security-sensitive data or operations. These strategies
bypass the requirement for detailed knowledge of the im-
plementation and may be thought of as ‘black box’ mod-
elling. A typical approach has been to focus on (search-
ably small) target intermediate values of interest (for ex-
ample, the output of an S-box). By measuring large num-
bers of leakage traces as the output of the target function
varies in a known way, it is possible to estimate the pa-
rameters of (for example) a multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution associated with each possible value taken by the
intermediate. Traces acquired from an equivalent device
with an unknown key (and therefore unknown interme-
diates) can then be compared against these fitted mod-
els (‘templates’) for the purposes of classification [3, 5].
Linear regression techniques can be used to reduce the
complexity of the leakage characterisation [23, 29]; the
assumption of normality can be avoided, for example
by building models using machine learning classification
techniques [14].
2.1.3 Model Building for Processor Instructions
In order to simulate leakage of arbitrary code sequences
on a given device we opt for (‘grey box’) instruction-
level characterisation. Previous instruction-level (and
higher code-level) simulations for the purposes of side-
channel analysis have settled for Hamming weight or
Hamming distance assumptions [26, 28] or have esti-
mated simple models constrained to be close to such
approximations [7, 6]. However, much earlier work by
Tiwari et al. [27] explores more complex model config-
urations for the purposes of simulating and minimising
the total power cost of software to be run on resource-
constrained devices. The authors find that not only do
instructions have different costs, but that those costs are
influenced by preceding instructions in a circuit. Their
models are thus comprised of instruction-specific aver-
age base costs additively combined with instruction-pair-
specific average circuit state overheads. This methodol-
ogy is not adequate for our purposes, as it essentially av-
erages over all possible data inputs—precisely the source
of variation that most needs to be captured and under-
stood in a side-channel context. Hence, we combine
similar instruction and instruction-interaction terms with
data-state, -transition and -interaction terms, drawing on
modern approaches to linear regression-based profiling
[4, 29] to handle the considerable added complexity.
2.1.4 Evaluating Model Quality
To build a model is to attempt to capture the most impor-
tant features of an underlying reality which is (at least
in the cases where such an exercise is useful and inter-
esting) unknown. For this reason it is generally not pos-
sible to definitively establish the quality of any model
(i.e., the extent to which it matches reality). However,
there do exist methods, depending on the various model-
fitting strategies adopted, for indicating whether the out-
put result is suitable for its desired purpose. An ap-
proach popular in the side-channel evaluation literature
is to estimate the amount of information (in bits) in the
true leakage which is successfully captured by an eval-
uator’s model for that leakage with a metric called the
perceived information (PI) [21, 8]. This retains the usual
shortfalling in that the question of how good the model
is essentially corresponds to the one of how close the PI
is to the true (as always, unknown) mutual information.
However, in [8] the authors show how to combine cross-
correlation and distance sampling to increase confidence
(or highlight problems) in models used for evaluation.
Nevertheless, for our purposes, the established tools
traditionally associated with linear regression model
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building are better suited as they allow disentangling the
contributions of component parts of the model as well as
commenting on overall model quality. The coefficient of
determination, or R2, is a popular goodness-of-fit mea-
sure which can be thought of as the proportion of the to-
tal variation in the sample which is explained by (i.e. can
be predicted by) the model. However, the R2 is notori-
ously difficult to interpret as it always increases with the
number of explanatory variables, hampering attempts to
compare models of different sizes. It can be adjusted by
penalising for the number of variables, but it is normally
recommended to compute the F-statistic (see Sect. 3.1)
to test for the statistically significant improvement of one
model over another. The F-test can also be used to test
overall model significance, which is useful in our case
where the exploitable (i.e. data dependent) variation may
only represent a small fraction of the total variation in the
traces (which includes noise and unrelated processes).
That is, a low R2 need not imply that a model is unfit for
purpose, as long as it represents a statistically significant
data-dependent component of the leakage; conversely, a
high R2 need not indicate a model as more fit for purpose
if the extra variation explained is irrelevant to the data-
dependent side-channel leakage or is a result of over-fit.
However, F-tests offer no reassurance that other im-
portant contributory factors have not been omitted from
the model. In the context of modelling for side-channel
detection, it is established practice to verify the adequacy
of the trace simulations by demonstrating that they reli-
ably reveal the same vulnerabilities as real trace mea-
surements. Previously, this has largely been attempted
by performing DPA attacks [7, 26]; for the purposes of
rigour, we propose to also utilise the leakage detection
framework of [10] (see Sect. 6.3).
2.2 ARM Cortex-M Processor Family
The ARM Cortex-M processor family[19] was first in-
troduced by ARM in 2004 to be used specifically within
small microcontrollers, unlike the Cortex-A and Cortex-
R families which, although introduced at the same time,
are aimed at higher-end applications. Within the fam-
ily there are six variants of processor: the M0, M0+,
M1, M3, M4 and M7, where the M0 provides the low-
est cost, size and power device, the M7 the highest per-
forming device, and the M0+, M3 and M4 processors sit
in-between. The M1 is much the same as the M0 how-
ever it has been designed as a “soft core” to run inside
a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). The M0 and
M3 share the same architecture as the M0+ and M4 re-
spectively, though the M0+ and M4 have additional fea-
tures on top of the basic processor architecture to provide
them with greater performance. The M7 processor is the
most recent (2014) and high performing of the Cortex-M
family.
Whilst the exact CPU architecture of the Cortex-M de-
vices is not publicly available, it can be assumed to re-
semble the basic architecture of ARM cores, as detailed
in [9]. Figure 1 shows a simplified version of the basic ar-
chitectural components: besides the arithmetic-logic unit
(ALU), there exists a hardware multiplier, and a (barrel)
shifter. The register banks feed into the ALU via two
buses, one of which is also connected to some data in/out
registers. There is a third bus that connects the output of
the ALU back into the register banks.
We select the Cortex-M0 and M4 processors (see
Tab. 2 in the Appendix for comparison) to evaluate us-
ing our clustering profiling methodology and go on to
further analyse and produce a leakage emulator for the
Cortex-M0. The reason for the selection of these two
processors is that they represent either ends of the spec-
trum for the older, more widely used, of the Cortex-M
family, allowing us to demonstrate that our methodology
can be applied to a range of processors.
Figure 1: Simplified ARM CPU architecture (redrawn
from [9]) for a 3-stage pipeline architecture.
2.3 Instructions
In this work we focus on profiling a select number (21)
of Thumb instructions that are highly relevant for im-
plementing symmetric cryptography, which run on both
the Cortex-M0 and M4 processors: ldr, ldrb, ldrh,
str, strb, strh, lsls, lsrs, rors, muls, eors, ands,
adds, adds #imm, subs, subs #imm, orrs, cmp, cmp
#imm, movs and movs #imm. Note that adds #imm and
subs #imm use 3-bit immediate values rather than 8-bit
values. All non-memory instructions use the s suffix and
so update the conditional flags and, in the case of the
Cortex-M0, can only use low registers. The implemen-
tation of the muls instruction takes a single cycle to ex-
ecute on both processors. We made this selection to in-
clude core instructions with particular use within (sym-
metric key) cryptographic algorithms, which tend to per-
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form operations on the set of unsigned integers. We also
focus on the instructions which contain the s suffix to
comply with restrictions required for many of the Cortex-
M0 instructions and, where there is the option to use the
non-suffixed instruction with higher registers (as with the
adds, subs and movs instructions), we chose the suf-
fixed version to maintain consistency with the other in-
structions.
Understanding and interpreting the input format of
the instructions is necessary in order to correctly model
them and the interactions between them. From Fig. 1 we
would expect three buses to be used for the ALU instruc-
tions, as well as for shift and multiply instructions where
the barrel shifter and hardware multiplier are present: the
A bus for operand 1, the B bus for operand 2 and the out-
put of the operation on the ALU bus. In our analysis we
do not consider the effects of ALU outputs, as we assume
the output of an instruction to be used as an input to a fol-
lowing instruction; we focus on the two operands of the
operation which we would expect to leak via the A and B
buses. We therefore take these to correspond to operands
1 and 2 respectively. For memory instructions we expect
the data being loaded or stored to leak on bus B, as well
as the data bus. To include this leakage and any interac-
tions it may have with the previous data value that was
on this bus, we set the data to be loaded or stored as the
value of operand 2 for all memory instructions. How we
model these operands based on the register selection of
the instructions is described below.
For the majority of non-memory instructions (i.e.
those other than ldr, ldrb, ldrh, str, strb, strh),
three different registers may be selected for use in the
format “inst rd , rn, rm/#imm”, where rd is the destina-
tion register for the output, rn the register holding the
first operand and rm the register containing the second
operand. However, mov and cmp instructions each have
only two registers: rd , rn and rn, rm respectively.
To simplify our configuration for modelling instruc-
tions, and to ensure enough registers for the analysis of
three instructions (where each register must be fixed be-
forehand), rd was the same as rn for all of these, limit-
ing the number of registers required for each instruction
to 2. This method also allowed us to more easily assess
switching effects in the destination register. We therefore
took operand 1 to be rd/rn and operand 2 to be rm.
Memory instructions have a slightly different con-
figuration as the second operand needs to be a valid
memory address. They typically have the form “inst
rt , [rn,rm/#imm]” where rt is the register to which the
data is to be stored or from which it is to be loaded
(according to the functionality of the instruction), rn is
the memory address and rm/#imm is the offset to this
memory address which can either be in a register rm or
input as an immediate value (#imm). The ldr instruc-
tion analysed was of this form rather than the alternative
form which loads the memory address of a label. For
our analysis we did not consider the leakage of mem-
ory addresses and so the value of the offset was simply
set to 0 for all memory instructions with the memory ad-
dress of rn fixed beforehand. We therefore have one main
operand for memory instructions which is the data in rt
for store instructions and the value in the memory ad-
dress of rn (data[rn]) for load instructions which we set to
operand 2 in both instances. For store instructions, we set
the data in memory which is to be overwritten (data[rn])
and for load instructions the register into which the data
is to be loaded (rt ) to be random data which we model as
operand 1 in both cases. This is to include any potential
leaks that could come from either of these sources, how-
ever we would do expect this to include bit interactions
with operand 1 of the previous instructions as we do not
expect either of these data values to be transmitted on bus
A in Fig. 1.
2.4 Measurement Setups
We work with implementations of the two processors by
ST Microelectronics on STM Discovery Boards, with the
ARM Cortex-M0 being implemented on an STM32F0
(30R8T6) Discovery Board and the ARM Cotex-M4 on
the STM32F4 (07VGT6). These boards both feature
an ST-Link to flash programs to the processor and pro-
vide on-chip debugging capabilities as well as on-board
RC oscillator clock signals (8Mhz and 16Mhz for the
STM32F0 and STM32F4 respectively). Further details
about the devices can be found in datasheets [24] and
[25].
In order to get accurate power measurements for the
Cortex-M0, we modified the STM32F0 board by ex-
tracting the power pins of the processor, and passing the
power supply through a 360Ω resistor over which a dif-
ferential probe was connected. This was to minimise the
potential for board and setup effects. We also verified the
stability of our power supply. To measure the EM emis-
sions on the Cortex-M4 processor we placed a small EM
probe over the output of one of the capacitors leading to
one of the power supply pins of the processor.
We used a Lecroy Waverunner 700 Zi scope at a sam-
pling rate of 500 MS/S for both the power and EM anal-
yses. The sampling rate was selected by observing DPA
outcomes on the Cortex-M0 across different sampling
rates: 500 MS/S was the lowest sampling rate at which
the best DPA outcomes were achieved. The clock speed
of the Cortex-M0 was set to 8Mhz and the Cortex-M4 set
to 16 Mhz. To lower the independent noise, we averaged
over five acquisitions per input for the power measure-
ments for the M0 (as this was found to be the lowest
number that brought the most signal gain) and 10 for the
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EM measurements for the M4 (to further reduce the addi-
tional noise associated with this method of taking traces).
No filtering or further signal processing took place for
the Cortex-M0 power measurements, however a 48Mhz
low-pass filter was used before amplifying the EM signal
for the Cortex-M4.
We note that our measurement of EM uses only one
probe over one of multiple power inputs to the proces-
sor (for the M0 we reduced the number of power inputs
to a single one over which to measure) and that, whilst
we have applied some pre-processing to the (noisier) EM
measurements, we could have attempted more thorough
techniques to enhance the signal. We view, therefore,
our two measurement setups for the different boards to
represent different ends of the spectrum in terms of the
time and effort invested to get improved measurements.
In this way we aim to gain an understanding of how our
profiling methodology adapts to different setup scenarios
as well as for different processors.
3 A Novel Methodology to Characterise a
Modern Microprocessor
In principle all components (i.e. on the lowest level of
gates and interconnects) contribute to the side channel
leakage in the form of power or EM and so could be
modelled as predictor variables. The skill and challenge
in model building is then to select and test (and possi-
bly discard) potential predictors in a systematic manner,
manoeuvring the trade-off between infeasible complex-
ity and oversimplification. We opt for a ‘grey box’ ap-
proach which does not require detailed hardware descrip-
tions but does assume access to assembly code in order to
construct models at the instruction level. We concentrate
on predictor variables that can be derived from assembly
sequences (i.e. input data, register locations), but we also
want to potentially account for board-specific effects.
Linear regression model-fitting techniques have been
used by the research community for some years al-
ready to profile side-channel leakage [23]. We refine the
adopted procedures according to well-established statis-
tical hypothesis testing strategies, in order to better un-
derstand the true functional form of the leakage and to
make informed judgements about candidate explanatory
variables. Specifically, we perform F-tests for the joint
significance of groups of related variables, and include
or exclude them accordingly, thus producing meaning-
ful explanatory models which are not unnecessarily com-
plex.
3.1 Model Building
We fit models of the following form (written in matrix
notation) to the measured leakage of different instruc-
tions via OLS estimation (see, e.g., Chapter 3 of [12]):
y = δ +[O1 |O2 |T1 |T2 ] β + ε (1)
where Oi = [xi[0] |xi[1] | . . . |xi[31] ] is the
matrix of operand bits across bus i = 1,2,
Ti = [xi[0]⊕ zi[0]| . . . |xi[31]⊕ zi[31] ] is the matrix
of bit transitions across bus i = 1,2 (i.e., [b] denotes the
bth-bit, xi denotes the ith operand to a given instruction,
zi denotes the ith operand to the previous instruction, and
‘|’ denotes matrix concatenation). The scalar intercept δ
and the vector of coefficients β are the model parameters
to be estimated, and ε is the vector of error terms (noise),
assumed for inference to have constant, uncorrelated
variance across all observations.1 If the noise can
additionally be assumed to be normally distributed then
the validity of the hypothesis tests holds without need of
recourse to asymptotic properties of the test statistics.
3.2 Selecting Explanatory Variables
The innovations we propose over previous uses of linear
regression for modelling side-channel leakage are with
respect to informed model selection. The task of select-
ing a meaningful subset from a large number of can-
didate explanatory variables is well-recognised as non-
trivial. Techniques such as stepwise regression [15] fully
automate the procedure by iteratively adding and remov-
ing individual terms according to their contribution to
the current configuration of the model. This approach
is sensitive to the order in which terms are introduced
and prone to over-fitting, and has attracted criticism for
greatly understating the uncertainty of the finalised mod-
els as typically reported. Stepwise regression has been
used to achieve so-called ‘generic-emulating’ DPA [30];
it is effective in this context because attack success does
not derive from the actual construction of the produced
models but requires only that the proportion of variance
accounted for is greater under the correct key hypoth-
esis than under the alternatives. However, we require
our models to be meaningful, not just (artificially) close-
fitting. Thus we adopt a more conservative and tradi-
tional approach towards model building by which in-
formed intuition about likely (jointly) contributing fac-
tors precedes formal statistical testing for inclusion or
exclusion.
The criterion for model inclusion is based on the F-
test. Consider two models, A and B, such that A is
‘nested’ within B—that is, it has pA < pB parameters
associated with a subset of model B’s fitted terms (e.g.
y = δ ′+[O2 |T1 |T2 ] β ′+ ε ′ versus (1) above). We are
interested in the joint significance of the terms omitted
1By mean-centering each trace prior to analysis we remove drift,
which could otherwise introduce auto-correlation.
204    26th USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association
from A (in our example case, the bits of the first operand).
The test statistic is computed via the residual sums of
squares (RSS) of each model, along with their respective
numbers of parameters pA, pB and the sample size n as
follows:
F =
(
RSSA−RSSB
pB−pA
)
(
RSSB
n−pB
) (2)
Under the null hypothesis that the terms have no effect,
F has an F-distribution with (pB− pA,n− pB) degrees of
freedom. If then, for a given significance level (usually
α = 5%, as we opt for throughout)2, F is larger than the
‘critical value’ of the FpB−pA,n−pB distribution
3 we reject
the null hypothesis and conclude that the tested terms do
have an effect. If F is smaller than the critical value, we
say that there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
In the same way, we can add other terms to model
(1) and test appropriate subsets in order to rigorously ex-
plore which factors influence the form of the leakage and
should therefore be taken into account in the final model.
We are especially concerned with sources of variation
that have a differential impact on the data-dependent
contributions, as these will determine how well we are
able to proportionally approximate the exploitable part of
the leakage (whereas ‘level’ (average) effects will simply
shift the model by an additive constant). In particular, we
test (in Sect. 5) for register, board and adjacent instruc-
tion effects on the operand and bit-flip contributions by
computing F-statistics for the associated sets of interac-
tion terms.
4 Identifying Basic Leakage Characteris-
tics
We first investigate the instruction-dependent form of the
leakage in a simple setting, where differential effects
from other factors do not yet play a role. For this pur-
pose, we perform the same fixed sequence mov-instr-mov
5,000 times for each selected instruction, as the two 32-
bit operands vary. We measure the power consumption
(or EM, in the case of the M4) associated with each se-
quence, and identify as a suitable point the maximum
peak4 in the clock cycle during which the instruction
leaks. We fit the model (1) to the (drift-adjusted) vec-
tor of measurements at this point.
Table 3 in the Appendix confirms the overall signif-
icance of the model for each M0 instruction. This sup-
ports our point selection and the intuition that the leakage
2The significance level should be understood as the probability of
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true.
3The number large enough to imply inconsistency with the distribu-
tional assumption fixing the probability of error at α .
4This choice is specific to our measurements and is by no means the
only option.
depends in part on the data being operated on. However,
some differences can be observed in the contributing fac-
tors:
• The load instructions depend only on the bits of the
operands (operand 2 or both for ldrh) and not the
bit flips.
• The store instructions depend only on the bits and
the bit transitions of the second operands.
• The operations on immediate values essentially
have no second operand on which to depend.
• For all the other instructions all tested sets of ex-
planatory variables are judged significant at the 5%
level, which the exception of the second operand bit
transitions for the mul.5
4.1 Further observations and indicators
for model quality
Although we caution in the background section that over-
interpreting the ‘raw’ value of resulting R-squareds is
not advisable, their relative values can provide some ev-
idence about the relative quality between (same-type)
models obtained via e.g. different setups and devices.
Hence we now discuss same-type models for the
M4, which we obtained using traces from a deliberately
weaker measurement setup. Table 4, also in the Ap-
pendix, shows the model results for the M4. The model
for the mov instruction is not found to be significant, im-
plying that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
the EM radiation of mov depends on its data operands
and bus transitions. The models for other instructions
are overall significant, but fewer of the data-dependent
terms are identified as contributing.
• Both operands to the ALU instructions contribute,
except in the case of those involving immediate
values (which, again, essentially have no second
operand).
• Only the second operand to the load and store in-
structions contributes significantly.
• Bus transitions contribute to the instructions on im-
mediate values, and also to cmp.
Whilst we again advise against over-interpreting the R-
squareds (see Section 2.1), a comparison between the
first rows of 3 and 4 indicates that, in the case of the
ALU and shift instructions, model (1) accounts for sub-
stantially less of the variation in the M4 EM traces than
it does of the variation in the M0 power traces. Although
this could be taken as evidence that the instructions in
question leak more in the case of the M0 and less in
5‘Significant at the 5% level’ is a shorthand way of saying that the
null hypothesis of ‘no effect’ is rejected by the F-test when the proba-
bility of a false rejection (Type I error) is fixed at 5%.
USENIX Association 26th USENIX Security Symposium    205
the case of the M4, it is more likely that the M4 model
is weaker because of the weaker setup as discussed in
Sect. 2.4). We take this as further evidence that statisti-
cal measures that we suggest as part of our methodology
are suitable to judge model quality.
4.2 Clustering Analysis to Identify Like In-
structions
We eventually want to allow for possible differences in
the leakage behaviours of instructions depending on ad-
jacent activity in sequences of code (as per [27]). This
will be much easier to achieve if we can reduce the num-
ber of distinct instructions requiring consideration. For
instance, we might expect instructions invoking the same
processor components (as visualised in Fig. 1) to leak
similarly: ALU instructions as one group (i.e. adds,
adds #imm, ands, eors, movs, movs #imm, orrs, subs,
subs #imm, cmp, cmp #imm), shifts as another, albeit
closely-related group (lsls, lsrs, rors), loads (ldr,
ldrb, ldrh) and stores (str, strb, strh) that interact
with the data in/out registers as two more groups, and the
multiply instruction (muls) as a group on its own with a
distinct profile due to its single cycle implementation.
We compare this intuitive grouping with that which is
empirically suggested by the data by performing cluster-
ing analysis (see, e.g., Chapter 14 of [12]) on the per-
instruction data term coefficients β obtained by fitting
model (1) for both the M0 and the M4. We use the av-
erage Euclidean distance between instruction models to
form a hierarchy of clusters (represented by the dendro-
grams in Fig. 6). Adjusting the inconsistency threshold6
between 0.7 and 1.2 produces the groupings reported in
Tables 5 and 6. In the case of the M0, these align nicely
with our intuitive grouping: at threshold 0.9 the match
is exact; at a threshold of 1.1 the shifts join the ALU
instructions; at a threshold of 1.2 the instructions form
a single cluster. In the case of the M4, the intuition is
confirmed to a degree: at threshold 0.8, the ALU instruc-
tions are spread out over four groups, and the store oper-
ations over two; but the shift operations cluster together,
as do the loads, and the mul is again identified as dis-
tinct. There is no overlap between the nine groups until
they form a single cluster at threshold 1.0.
A ‘good’ cluster arrangement will achieve high sim-
ilarity within groups and high dissimilarity between
groups. The silhouette value is a useful measure to gauge
this, defined for the ith object as Si = bi−aimax(ai,bi) , where ai
is the average distance from the ith object to the other
6The inconsistency coefficient is defined as the height of the indi-
vidual link minus the mean height of all links at the same hierarchical
level, all divided by the standard deviation of all the heights on that
level (see Matlab’s cluster command: http://uk.mathworks.
com/help/stats/cluster.html).
objects in the same cluster, and bi is the minimum (over
all clusters) average distance from the ith object to the
objects in a different cluster [22]. Fig. 2 plots the M0
cluster silhouettes for a selection of the arrangements in
Tab. 5. The consistency threshold of 0.9 is associated
with the highest median silhouette value (0.56), support-
ing our a priori intuition.
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Figure 2: Silhouette plots for each M0 cluster arrange-
ment (numbers in parentheses report median silhouette
indices).
4.3 Functional Form of the Leakage
We next look more closely at the form of the estimated
leakage models. Fig. 3 plots the mean data-dependent
coefficients associated with the different terms in the
model equations, for each of the five M0 groups sug-
gested by the clustering analysis with a threshold of 0.9.
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Figure 3: Average estimated coefficients on the model
terms for each ‘found’ M0 instruction cluster
The differences between the groups are immediately
clear. We make the following observations for the M0:
• ALU instructions (adds, ands, cmps, eors, movs,
orrs and subs, and their immediate value equiv-
alents where relevant) leak primarily in the transi-
tion between the first operands given to the current
and previous instruction. However, not all the bits
of this transition contribute; most of the explained
leakage is in three bits of the third operand byte and
one in the fourth.
• Shifts (lsls, lsrs, rors) appear to leak in the
first operand (which contains the data being shifted)
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and the transition between that and the first operand
for the preceding instruction. The coefficients are
largest for the third and (to a lesser extent) the fourth
bytes. The transition leakage applies only to a few
bits, while the operand leakage is more spread out
between the bits. There is some evidence of leakage
from the first three bits of the second operand.
• Stores (str, strb, strh) leak primarily in the first
byte of the second operand.
• Loads (ldr, ldrb, ldrh) leak across most bits of
the second operand. This shape is closest to the
typically-made Hamming weight assumption.
• Multiply (muls) leaks mostly in the first two bytes
of the first and second operand. The coefficients
on the first operand are large for just six of the bits
while the second operand coefficients are medium-
sized across all bits of the first two bytes.
In summary, our exploratory analysis of the data-
dependent form of the instruction leakages confirms
many of our a priori intuitions about the architecture
and supports our model building approach as sensible
and meaningful. It also indicates that we can lessen
the burden of the task by reducing the number of dis-
tinct instructions to be modelled to a meaningfully rep-
resentative subset of the initial 21. Reducing unneces-
sary complexity in the instruction set increases the scope
for adding meaningfully explanatory complexity to the
models themselves, which we proceed to do in the next
section for the power consumption of the M0.
5 Building Complex Models for the M0
From this point forward we concentrate on the M0 and
seek to build more complex, sequence-dependent models
for five instructions chosen to represent the groups iden-
tified by the clustering analysis of Sect. 4.2: eors, lsls,
str, ldr and muls. The model coefficients for each of
these are shown in Fig. 7 (see Appendix). As we would
hope, they can be observed (by comparing with Fig. 3)
to match well the mean coefficients for the groups that
they represent, with the possible exception of str, which
has smaller coefficients on the first byte than the average
within its group.
We are confident that these five are adequate for un-
derstanding the leakage behaviour of all 21. Restricting
the analysis in this way enables exhaustive exploration of
the effects of preceding and subsequent operations when
instructions are performed in sequence.7
7Such an approach implicitly makes the further assumption that in-
structions within each identified cluster are affected similarly by the
sequence of which they are a part.
5.1 Exploring Board Effects
To understand if we need to account for variation be-
tween boards we replicate the M0 acquisition described
at the start of Section 4 for a further 7 boards. We find
the leaking point for each acquisition and pool the data.
We then fit model (1) with the addition of a dummy for
(level) board effects and we compare this against a model
with the further addition of board/data interaction dum-
mies, in order to test the joint significance of the latter.
We find a remarkable degree of consistency in the
data-dependent leakage of the different boards. F-tests
for the joint interaction between board and data effects
do not reject the null hypothesis of ‘no effect’ for any of
the instructions This also implies that our setup has min-
imised (or even removed) any measurable impact on the
processor’s power consumption.
5.2 Exploring Register Effects
The ARM Cortex-M0 architecture distinguishes between
low (r0–r7) and high (r8–r15) registers. The latter, which
can only be accessed by the mov instruction, are used for
fast temporary storage. These were observed by inspec-
tion to have different leakage characteristics to the low
registers. However, due to their singular usage we con-
sider them outside of the scope of this particular analysis
and focus only on the low registers. For the purposes of
future extensions to our methodology, we propose mod-
elling high register movs as an additional distinct instruc-
tion.
We test for variation between the eight low registers
by collecting 5,000 traces for each source register (rn)
and destination register (rd) (evenly distributed over the
possible source/destination pairs, making 625 per pair)
as movs are performed on random inputs. We then fit
model (1) with the addition of dummy variables for
source register and for destination register, and compare
this against a model with the further addition of register/-
data interaction dummies, in order to test the significance
of the latter.
We find that the registers do have a jointly significant
effect on the leakage data-dependency (see LHS of Tab. 7
in Appendix A). Considered separately, only the source
register effect remains significant; at the 5% level we do
not reject the null hypothesis that the destination register
has no effect. Moreover, the effect can be isolated (by
testing one ‘source register interaction’ at a time relative
to the model with no source register interactions) to just
half the source registers (r0, r1, r4 and r7).
This analysis suggests that the inclusion of (some)
source register effects would increase the ability of
the model to accurately approximate the data-dependent
leakage. However, such an extension would add consid-
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erable complexity; it is important to examine the prac-
tical significance of the effects as well as the statisti-
cal significance which, in large sample sizes (such as
we deal with here), will eventually be detected even for
very small differences. The figure on the right of Tab. 7
(Appendix A) shows the estimated coefficients on the
data terms as the source register varies. The ‘significant’
effect is at least small enough that it cannot be easily
visualised—a legitimate criteria for assessing practical
significance according to [2], although we have not car-
ried out the formal visual inspection there proposed. We
judge it acceptable, for now, to exclude it from the model
in order to incorporate more important factors such as the
effect of previous and subsequent instructions, which we
consider in Sect. 5.3.
5.3 Allowing For Sequence Dependency
In this section we work towards extending our instruction
level models to control (and test) for the possible effects
of the previous and subsequent instructions in a given
sequence.
To achieve this we acquired 1,000 traces for each of
the possible 125 combinations of three out of the five in-
structions, with random data inputs. We alternated the
sequences within a single acquisition to minimise the
possibility of conflating instruction sequence effects with
drift or acquisition effects, and mean-centered them to
adjust for any overall drift. We compressed the traces to a
single point (the maximum power peak) in each clock cy-
cle, and selected the clock cycle most strongly associated
with the data inputs to the target (middle) instruction. For
the ldr instruction (which is two cycles long) the rele-
vant point was one cycle ahead of that of the muls, lsls
and eors; for str, the relevant point was three clock
cycles ahead, implying that the data leaked during the
subsequent instruction.
Using these relevant points, we then built models for
each target instruction in function of its operands, as in
model (1), with the addition of dummy variables for pre-
vious and subsequent instructions. We further allow for
the data-dependent component to vary via four sets of in-
teraction terms: the product of the instruction dummies
with the Hamming weights of each operand and also with
the corresponding Hamming distances (the sum of bit-
flips). This enables a degree of flexibility in estimating
the form of the data dependency whilst avoiding the in-
troduction of an infeasible number of instruction/data bit
interaction terms into the model equation.
For ease of presentation consider the following groups
of variables which together comprise the full set of ex-
planatory variables:
• Ip: The previous instruction in the sequence, fitted
as a dummy variable (with eors as baseline to pre-
serve linear independence).
• Is: The subsequent instruction in the sequence, fit-
ted similarly to Ip.
• D= [O1 |O2 |T1 |T2 ]: All 128 operand bit and tran-
sition dummies.
• DxIp = [O1xIp |O2xIp |T1xIp |T2xIp ]: The Ham-
ming weights of the two 32-bit operands and their
Hamming distances from the previous two inputs,
interacted with the ‘previous instruction’ dummies
(i.e. the products of the four summarised data terms
with each of the four instruction dummies).
• DxIs = [O1xIs |O2xIs |T1xIs |T2xIs ]: The Ham-
ming weights of the two 32-bit operands and their
Hamming distances from the previous two inputs,
interacted with the ‘subsequent instruction’ dum-
mies, as above.
The extended model, in our matrix notation, is there-
fore:
y = δ +[Ip |Is |D |DxIp |DxIs ] β + ε (3)
For the purposes of building comprehensive
instruction-level models we are especially inter-
ested in confirming (or otherwise) the presence of
sequence-varying data-dependency, which we again
achieve by performing F-tests for the contribution of the
interaction terms. Table 8, in the Appendix, shows that
the full set of interaction terms are jointly significant
(at the 5% level) in all cases, as are the previous and
subsequent instruction interactions considered sepa-
rately. We also divide the interaction terms into four
groups according to the operand or transition with which
they are each associated, in order to test whether the
varying data-dependency arises from all or just a subset
(in which case we could reduce the complexity of the
model). Only for the str model do we fail to find
evidence of significant effects for all four, suggesting
(in that case) the possibility of removing operand 1 and
transition 2 terms without cost to the model.
We thus conclude that the form of the data-dependent
leakage depends significantly on the previous and sub-
sequent instructions within a sequence, and recommend
that they be taken into account (as we have done here)
when seeking to build comprehensive instruction-level
models.
5.4 Exploring Higher-Order Effects
An obvious limitation of model (3) is that it restricts the
relationship between the bits/transitions and the leakage
to be linear. In practice, it is reasonable to suppose (for
example) that bits carried on adjacent wires may produce
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some sort of interaction. Previous analyses fitting lin-
ear regression models to target values [13, 29] have al-
lowed for these and for other higher-order interactions,
increasing the possibility of accounting for even more
exploitable variation in the leakage. However, they have
failed to investigate if such effects are in fact present.
We therefore test for the inclusion of adjacent and non-
adjacent bit interactions in model (3). Table 9, in the Ap-
pendix, shows that we find significant effects precisely
(and only) where we would expect to: in the leakages of
lsls and muls, instructions which explicitly involve the
joint manipulation of bits within the operands. We also
test for adjacent bit flip interactions, which are not found
to contribute significantly towards any of the instruction
leakages. For the purposes of simulation, we therefore
elect to use model (3) in the case of eors, str and ldr,
and model (3) with the addition of input bit interactions
in the case of lsls and muls.
6 Using and Evaluating our Grey Box
Models in a Practical Context
Up until know we have considered short instruction se-
quences. We have shown that our novel approach pro-
duces models which, when evaluated in the context of an
instruction triplet, include statistically relevant and archi-
tecturally justified terms. Furthermore, our methodology
clearly indicates model quality: the models derived from
a dedicated setup for monitoring the power consumption
showed much better statistics then the models derived
from the much less sophisticated EM setup.
However, to make the final argument that our approach
results in models that are useful in the context of arbitrary
instruction sequences, we need to consider code that is
longer and more varied then the triplets that we used for
model building. We also need to define a measure that al-
lows us to judge how good the ‘match’ between model-
simulated and real power traces is. We could consider
randomly generating arbitrary code sequences (of some
predefined length), and defining some distance measure.
However, because we have a very clear application for
these models in mind, we opt for a more decisive and
targeted evaluation strategy. The ultimate test, arguably,
is to utilise our models for the M0 to evaluate the se-
curity different implementation of a cryptographic algo-
rithm (e.g. AES). To conduct such a test, we build an
Emulator for power Leakages for the M0 (short: ELMO,
elaborated on in the next section). In this context we
expect that leakage simulations based our newly con-
structed models enable to detect leaks that relate to the
modelled instructions, but also (maybe more simply) that
our models correlate well to measured traces.
6.1 ELMO
As follows from Sect. 3, our instruction-level models
work with code that has been compiled down to assembly
level, easily obtained via the ARM toolchain. Comput-
ing model predictions requires knowledge of the inputs
to instructions, which entails emulating a given piece of
code in order to extract the data flow. There are a num-
ber of instruction-level emulators available for the ARM,
Thumb and Thumb2 instruction sets due to the popular-
ity of these processors.
We choose an open source (programmed in C) emula-
tor called Thumbulator8. We choose this over more well-
known emulators9 for its simplicity and ease of adaptiv-
ity for our purposes. One disadvantage of this choice is
that it is inevitably less well-tested than its more popular
rivals; it also omits the handful of Thumb-2 instructions
which are available in the ARMv6-M instruction set, al-
though we did not profile any of these. Of course, any of
the other emulators could be equally incorporated within
our methodology.
The Thumbulator takes as input a binary program in
Thumb assembly, and decodes and executes each instruc-
tion sequentially, using a number of inbuilt functions to
handle loads and stores to memory and reads and writes
to registers. It provides the capability to trace the in-
struction and memory flow of a program for the purpose
of debugging. Our data flow adaptation is built around
a linked list data structure: in addition to the instruction
type, the values of the two operands and the associated
bit-flips from the preceding operands are stored in 32-
element binary arrays.
The operand values, and associated bit-flips from the
preceding operations, are then used as input to the model
equations (as derived in Sect. 5; see Eqn. (1)), one for
each profiled instruction group. Summarising, simulat-
ing the power consumption requires deriving, from the
data flow information, the variables corresponding to the
terms in the equations: the previous and subsequent in-
structions, the bits and the bit-flips of each operand, the
Hamming weight and Hamming distances, and the ad-
jacent bit interactions where relevant (i.e. for lsls and
muls). The variables are then weighted by the appro-
priate coefficient vector and summed to give a leakage
value, which is written to a trace file and saved.
8Source code at: https://github.com/dwelch67/
thumbulator.git/
9E.g. QEMU http://wiki.qemu.org/, Armulator https://
sourceforge.net/projects/armulator/
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6.2 Evaluating Model Correlation to Real
Leakages
A simple way to check how well a model corresponds to
real leakage behaviour is to compute the (Pearson) cor-
relation between the model predictions for a particular
instruction (operating on a set of known inputs) and the
measured traces corresponding to a code sequence con-
taining that same instruction (operating on the same in-
puts). This procedure can be used to demonstrate the im-
provement of our derived models over weaker, assumed
models, such as the Hamming weight.
Figure 4 juxtaposes the correlation traces produced by
the Hamming weight prediction of the leakage associ-
ated with the first round output as the M0 performs AES
(top), and by the ELMO prediction corresponding to the
same intermediate being loaded into the register (mid-
dle). It can be clearly seen that the ELMO model gen-
erates larger peaks, and more of them. The bottom of
Figure 4 shows, for comparison, the peaks which are ex-
hibited when the model predictions are correlated with
an equivalent set of ELMO-emulated traces. These in-
dicate the same leakage points as displayed in the mea-
sured traces, with the advantage of enhanced definition
thanks to the lack of (data-independent) noise in the sim-
ulations. It thus emerges that Hamming weight-based
simulations do not give a full picture of the true leakage
of an implementation on an M0, and should not be relied
upon for pre-empting data sensitivities. The same picture
emerges for the other instructions but we do not include
an exhaustive analysis for the sake of brevity. In conclu-
sion, our models represent a marked improvement over
simply using the Hamming weight.
6.3 Evaluating Models via Leakage Detec-
tion
Further to the capability of our models to improve cor-
relation analysis, we now show that they can also be ap-
plied to the task of (automated) leakage detection on as-
sembly implementations. They can thereby be used to
spot ‘subtle’ leaks – that is, leaks that would be difficult
for non-specialist software engineers to understand and
pinpoint.
To aid readability we briefly overview the leakage
detection procedures proposed by Goodwill et al. [10].
These are based on classical statistical hypothesis tests,
and can be categorised as specific or non-specific. Spe-
cific tests divide the traces into two subsets based on
some known intermediate value such as an output bit of
an S-box or the equality (or otherwise) of a round output
byte to a particular value. The non-specific ‘fixed-versus-
random’ test acquires traces associated with a particular
fixed data input and compares them against traces asso-
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Figure 4: Correlation traces for ELMO-predicted inter-
mediate values (top) and Hamming weight model pre-
dictions (middle) in 500 real M0 traces; correlation trace
for ELMO-predicted intermediate values in the equiva-
lent set of ELMO-emulated traces (bottom).
ciated with random inputs. In all cases the Welch’s two-
sample t-test for equality of means is then performed;
results that are larger than a defined threshold, which we
indicate via a dotted line in our figures, are taken as evi-
dence for a leak.
6.3.1 Detecting ‘Subtle’ Leaks
We now choose a code sequence relating to a suppos-
edly protected AES operation. The code sequence im-
plements a standard countermeasure called masking [1].
Masking essentially distributes all intermediate vari-
ables into shares which are statistically independent, but
whose composition (typically by way of exclusive-or) re-
sults in the (unmasked) variables. Consequently, stan-
dard DPA attacks [18] no longer succeed. The ease of
implementation in software and ability to provide some
sort of proof of leakage resilience has made masking a
popular side channel attack countermeasure, on the re-
ceiving end of considerable attention from academia and
industry alike. However, it is also well-known that im-
plementations of masking schemes can produce subtle
unanticipated leakages [17].
We faithfully implemented a masking scheme for AES
(as described in [17]) in Thumb assembly to avoid the
potential introduction of masking flaws by the compiler
(from C to assembly). The code sequence, which we
will analyse and discuss, relates to an operation called
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ShiftRows which takes place as part of the AES round
function. In a masked implementation, this results in a
masked row (i.e. which would typically be stored within
a register) being rotated and then written back into mem-
ory. Table 1 shows the assembly code for ShiftRows. An
experienced and side-channel aware implementer who
has detailed leakage information about the M0 would
now be able to spot a problem with this code: because
the ror instruction also leaks a function of the Hamming
distance to its predecessor, there could be problem if the
prior instruction is protected by the same mask. Clearly
an inexperienced implementer, or somebody who does
not have the necessary profiling information, would not
be able to make this inference.
We now show that ELMO traces (for this same code
sequence) can be used for the purposes of (pre-emptive)
leakage detection. Since we do not expect any specific,
simple leaks to be detectable under masking, we con-
figured a ‘fixed-versus-random’ test to check instead for
arbitrary leaks. Figure 5 shows that the analysis of our
model-simulated traces indicates the presence of leaks
in several instructions (see also Tab. 1 where they are
colour-coded in red). These leaks are precisely due to the
ror leakage properties that we discussed in the previous
paragraph. The figure shows that all real-measurement
leaks can be identified from the simulations, with the
exception of some lingering leakage in the cycles after
the final ldr. We believe this results from the fact that
our models are constructed at instruction level rather than
clock-cycle level—so the leakage arising from a particu-
lar instruction is tied to the cycle in which it is performed.
Whilst this degrades the visual similarity of our simula-
tions, it has the big advantage that we can easily track
back to the ‘offending’ instruction.
In short, our grey box approach to modelling side-
channel leakage proves highly successful at capturing
and replicating potentially vulnerable data-dependency
in arbitrary sequences of assembly code.
Cycle Address Machine Assembly Code
No. Code
1-2 0x08000206 0x684C ldr r4,[r1,#0x4]
3 0x08000208 0x41EC ror r4,r5
4-5 0x0800020A 0x604C str r4,[r1,#0x4]
6-7 0x0800020C 0x688C ldr r4,[r1,#0x8]
8 0x0800020E 0x41F4 ror r4,r6
9-10 0x08000210 0x608C str r4,[r1,#0x8]
11-12 0x08000212 0x68CC ldr r4,[r1,#0xC
13 0x08000214 0x41FC ror r4,r7
14-15 0x08000216 0x60CC str r4,[r1,#0xC]
Table 1: Thumb assembly implementation of ShiftRows
showing (colour-coded in red) leaky instructions as indi-
cated by the model-simulated power consumption.
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Figure 5: Fixed vs random t-tests against the (simu-
lated and real) power consumption of masked ShiftRows.
(Dotted lines indicate the±4.5 threshold for t-test signif-
icance).
7 Conclusion
We have shown how to combine a ‘grey box’ view of
a cryptographic device with well-understood statistical
techniques for model construction and evaluation in or-
der to profile and simulate instruction-level side-channel
leakage traces. Our methodology enables informed and
statistically-testable decisions between candidate predic-
tor variables, as well as empirically-verified clustering of
like instructions. In this way, redundant complexity can
be removed to increase the scope for additional explana-
tory complexity in our models. The procedure is appro-
priate for use with different devices and side-channels,
and is self-equipped with the capability to identify sce-
narios where the measurements in question contain lit-
tle of interest (i.e. minimal data-dependency). In addi-
tion to the valuable insights this methodology provides
into leakage behaviours, which are of immediate interest
to the side channel experts, it has considerable practi-
cal application via the integration of our models into a
side-channel simulator (ELMO). We are thereby able to
produce leakage traces for arbitrary sequences of code
which demonstrably exhibit the same vulnerabilities as
the same code sequences running on a real device. This
capability suggests a variety of highly beneficial possi-
ble uses, such as the automated detection of leakages in
the software development stage and the automated inser-
tion (and testing) of countermeasures, as well as hugely
promising prospects for optimisation with respect to pro-
tection level and energy efficiency.
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A Supplementary Tables and Figures
Feature Cortex M0 Cortex M4
Architecture Von-Newman Harvard
Word size 32 bit 32 bit
Multiplier Single cycle Single cycle
Instruction set Thumb (complete) Thumb (complete)
Thumb-2 (some) Thumb-2 (complete)
Additional DSP and FPU
Barrel shift instructions No Yes
Total instructions 56 137; Optional 32 for FPU
Table 2: Comparison between Cortex-M0 and Cortex-
M4 microprocessors. Information taken from [24] [25]
[19].
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Figure 6: Dendrograms representing the hierarchical
clustering of the M0 (left) and M4 (right instructions ac-
cording to the fitted leakage models.
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Figure 7: Estimated coefficients on the model terms for
each chosen representative M0 instruction.
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Figure 8: Estimated coefficients on the data terms as
source register varies.
USENIX Association 26th USENIX Security Symposium    213
adds adds ands cmp cmp eors ldr ldrb ldrh lsls lsrs
#imm #imm
R-squared 0.276 0.289 0.253 0.227 0.260 0.202 0.147 0.107 0.187 0.296 0.292
F-
st
at
is
tic
Operand 1 19.36 6.09 5.20 15.60 7.32 4.29 0.93 0.82 1.53 32.88 32.70
Operand 2 10.23 -0.00 7.25 4.70 0.00 3.92 22.55 14.59 30.78 7.22 5.18
Transition 1 23.35 29.52 30.40 20.25 24.12 19.35 0.93 1.18 1.40 20.18 18.88
Transition 2 5.20 24.11 9.11 3.76 20.95 10.66 1.22 1.43 0.67 1.92 2.96
Combined 14.51 15.44 12.89 11.19 13.40 9.63 6.55 4.54 8.78 15.98 15.69
movs movs muls orrs rors str strb strh subs subs
#imm #imm
R-squared 0.255 0.455 0.278 0.214 0.315 0.061 0.075 0.067 0.237 0.271
F-
st
at
is
tic
Operand 1 3.18 8.80 32.68 3.17 24.02 1.24 0.72 1.12 13.78 5.38
Operand 2 3.93 -0.00 20.93 3.52 20.28 4.99 7.36 5.18 3.45 0.00
Transition 1 22.83 53.03 2.25 15.44 23.60 1.06 1.29 1.21 24.07 27.96
Transition 2 20.71 63.83 1.05 17.25 1.90 2.46 2.66 3.55 4.68 23.53
Combined 13.04 31.71 14.68 10.34 17.50 2.46 3.10 2.73 11.82 14.16
Table 3: F-tests for significant joint data effects in the power consumption of the M0; tests which fail to reject at the
5% level are shaded grey. Critical values shown in brackets in the row headings. Degrees of freedom for the F-tests
are (128,4871) for the combined test, (32,4871) for the rest.
adds adds ands cmp cmp eors ldr ldrb ldrh lsls lsrs
#imm #imm
R-squared 0.048 0.052 0.049 0.050 0.086 0.051 0.148 0.135 0.124 0.047 0.055
F-
st
at
is
tic
Operand 1 1.58 3.82 1.72 2.16 10.96 3.80 1.13 1.04 1.11 0.76 1.09
Operand 2 3.98 -0.00 3.92 3.49 0.00 2.63 22.97 20.18 18.00 4.59 6.09
Transition 1 1.33 0.63 1.25 0.73 0.81 1.02 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.70 0.51
Transition 2 0.67 4.07 0.73 1.47 2.25 0.87 0.91 0.67 0.87 1.11 1.07
Combined 1.94 2.11 1.97 1.98 3.60 2.06 6.60 5.92 5.41 1.88 2.20
movs movs muls orrs rors str strb strh subs subs
#imm #imm
R-squared 0.029 0.063 0.038 0.038 0.117 0.546 0.814 0.691 0.046 0.068
F-
st
at
is
tic
Operand 1 1.09 0.76 1.30 2.59 15.85 1.13 1.09 1.05 2.62 7.06
Operand 2 1.01 0.00 1.87 1.88 2.00 177.01 649.37 329.94 2.47 0.00
Transition 1 1.13 0.88 1.58 0.77 1.13 0.75 1.01 0.98 0.68 1.57
Transition 2 1.35 8.29 1.16 0.68 1.06 0.87 1.14 0.72 1.32 2.52
Combined 1.15 2.54 1.48 1.51 5.05 45.73 166.32 85.10 1.84 2.80
Table 4: F-tests for significant joint data effects in the EM radiation of the M4; tests which fail to reject at the 5%
level are shaded grey. Critical values shown in brackets in the row headings. Degrees of freedom for the F-tests are
(128,4871) for the combined test, (32,4871) for the rest.
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CT Intuitive group Instructions (in
1 2 3 4 5 descending order of SI)
0.7
2 0 0 0 0 cmp subs
2 0 0 0 0 cmpimm subsimm
2 0 0 0 0 orrs movs
1 0 0 0 0 addsimm
1 0 0 0 0 eors
1 0 0 0 0 ands
1 0 0 0 0 movsimm
1 0 0 0 0 adds
0 2 0 0 0 lsls lsrs
0 1 0 0 0 rors
0 0 2 0 0 strh strb
0 0 1 0 0 str
0 0 0 2 0 ldrh ldr
0 0 0 1 0 ldrb
0 0 0 0 1 muls
0.8
3 0 0 0 0 subimm cmpimm addsimm
3 0 0 0 0 movs eors orrs
2 0 0 0 0 cmp subs
1 0 0 0 0 ands
1 0 0 0 0 movsimm
1 0 0 0 0 adds
0 3 0 0 0 lsls lsrs rors
0 0 3 0 0 strb strh str
0 0 0 3 0 ldr ldrh ldrb
0 0 0 0 1 muls
0.9
11 0 0 0 0 addsimm movsimm subsimm movs
cmpimm ands orrs eors subs
cmp adds
0 3 0 0 0 lsls lsrs rors
0 0 3 0 0 strb strh str
0 0 0 3 0 ldr ldrh ldrb
0 0 0 0 1 muls
1.0
11 0 0 0 0 adds addsimm ands cmp cmpimm
eors movs movsimm orrs subs
subsimm
0 3 0 0 0 lsls lsrs rors
0 0 3 0 0 str strb strh
0 0 0 3 0 ldr ldrb ldrh
0 0 0 0 1 muls
1.1
11 3 0 0 0 adds addsimm ands cmp cmpimm
eors lsls lsrs movs movsimm
orrs rors subs subsimm
0 0 3 0 0 str strb strh
0 0 0 3 0 ldr ldrb ldrh
0 0 0 0 1 muls
1.2 11 3 3 3 1 (all; SI undefined)
Table 5: M0: Found clusters compared with intuitive
grouping (1 = ALU, 2 = shifts, 3 = stores, 4 = loads, 5 =
multiply) as the consistency threshold (CT) increases.
CT Intuitive group Instructions (in
1 2 3 4 5 descending order of SI)
0.7
2 0 0 0 0 cmp cmpimm
2 0 0 0 0 ands orrs
1 0 0 0 0 movsimm
1 0 0 0 0 subs
1 0 0 0 0 eors
1 0 0 0 0 addsimm
1 0 0 0 0 adds
1 0 0 0 0 movs
1 0 0 0 0 subsimm
0 2 0 0 0 rors lsrs
0 1 0 0 0 lsls
0 0 2 0 0 strh str
0 0 1 0 0 strb
0 0 0 2 0 ldrb ldrh
0 0 0 1 0 ldr
0 0 0 0 1 muls
5 0 0 0 0 cmp cmpimm subs movsimm eors
0.8
4 0 0 0 0 orrs ands addsimm adds
1 0 0 0 0 movs
1 0 0 0 0 subsimm
0.9
0 3 0 0 0 lsrs rors lsls
0 0 2 0 0 strh str
0 0 1 0 0 strb
0 0 0 3 0 ldr ldrh ldrb
0 0 0 0 1 muls
1.0 11 3 3 3 1 (all; SI undefined)
Table 6: M4: Found clusters compared with intuitive
grouping (1 = ALU, 2 = shifts, 3 = stores, 4 = loads, 5 =
multiply) as the consistency threshold (CT) increases.
Interaction effect F-stat Degrees of Crit.
freedom value
All registers 1.207 (896, 39025) 1.080
Source registers 1.357 (448, 39025) 1.113
Destination registers 1.034 (448, 39025) 1.113
Source register = 0 1.398 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 1 1.689 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 2 1.300 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 3 1.151 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 4 1.496 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 5 1.025 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 6 1.838 (64, 39409) 1.308
Source register = 7 1.098 (64, 39409) 1.308
Table 7: F-statistics for register interaction effects (tests
which fail to reject at the 5% level are shaded grey).
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eors lsls str ldr muls
R2
Full model 0.936 0.902 0.780 0.953 0.874
Ip only model 0.550 0.579 0.572 0.629 0.524
Is only model 0.372 0.294 0.194 0.316 0.292
D only model 0.014 0.031 0.016 0.012 0.057
F
DxIp, DxIs (32) 18.5 20.8 5.5 6.2 23.7
DxIp (16) 23.4 26.7 3.6 5.9 30.5
DxIs (16) 13.6 14.8 7.4 6.6 16.9
O1xIp, O1xIs (8) 8.9 5.3 0.4 2.6 4.4
O2xIp, O2xIs (8) 33.0 25.4 3.3 8.6 11.6
T1xIp, T1xIs (8) 43.5 25.4 11.9 3.2 15.9
T2xIp, T2xIs (8) 8.9 4.8 0.5 2.1 23.5
Table 8: R-squareds for subsets of the M0 instruction
models, and F-statistics for the marginal contributions of
the interaction terms. df1 is shown in parenthesis; df2 is
24,831 in all cases. Tests which fail to reject at the 5%
level are shaded grey.
Tested interactions eors lsls str ldr muls
Adjacent bits 1.026 3.877 1.075 0.885 13.390
Adjacent bit flips 0.977 0.603 1.089 1.019 1.047
Non-adjacent bits 1.068 1.295 0.930 0.969 1.372
Table 9: F-tests for significant pairwise bit interaction ef-
fects (adjacent and non-adjacent) in the power consump-
tion of the M0; tests which fail to reject at the 5% level
are shaded grey. Degrees of freedom are (62,24769),
(62,24707) and (930,23839) respectively.
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